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SUBJECT: U/SYG PASCOE SAYS UN CYPRUS PLANS DEPEND ON
ELECTION

Classified By: Ambassador Alex Wolff, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Summary: In a September 27 meeting with visiting EUR DAS Matt Bryza, UN U/SYG Lynn Pascoe said that if President Papadopoulos of Cyprus loses the election in February then he will push to appoint a new special envoy for the Cyprus conflict and work on brokering a new settlement plan. Pascoe said the UN Secretary General would neither recommend a change in UNFICYP's mandate nor mention the international isolation of the Turkish Cypriot north in his December report. Pascoe said he had argued to SYG Ban that existing UN Georgia policy merely reinforces a status quo where the country's separatist regions remain Russian spheres of influence. Pascoe said he was pushing to conduct an overall review of Georgia policy, which he speculated would upset Russia if implemented. End summary.

¶2. (C) U/SYG Pascoe opened a September 27 meeting with EUR DAS Matt Bryza by stating that if "the stars are aligned" and President Papadopoulos of Cyprus loses in February's presidential elections, he will push to appoint an experienced diplomat as a new special envoy for the Cyprus conflict and try to broker a new settlement plan. If Papadopoulos is returned to office, however, Pascoe said he will stick to promoting the July 8, 2006 Agreement negotiated by former U/SYG Gambari, and "we will all keep going around in circles." Pascoe noted he had spoken with Swedish officials the day before about their ideas for expanding UN involvement on the stalled July 8, 2006 Agreement and had told them now was not the right time for action.

¶3. (C) DAS Bryza asked Pascoe if making audible "voices of impatience" among the EU and the broader international community with the lack of movement on the Cyprus conflict could have a positive influence, noting that U/S Burns wants a new UN special envoy, but at the right time. Pascoe replied that the EU cannot do much politically, but if a way can be found to make Papadopoulos feel some pressure, and cause him to change his uncooperative approach, that could be helpful. Pascoe inquired what Bryza thought the chances were that AKEL and DISY, the two other parties backing presidential candidates in elections on Cyprus, would ban together to defeat Papadopoulos. At this point, a member of Pascoe's staff interjected that the most recent polls showed Papadopoulos slightly ahead in the three-way race. DAS Bryza asked if a message saying that things are drifting in a dangerous direction towards two states on the island, could be useful for the UN or EU to give Greek Cypriots. Pascoe replied that he did not know how UN statements would play during an electoral period and that expressions of concern

about an eventual two-state solution would be "a bridge too far" for the UN.

¶4. (C) When asked about the UNFICYP mandate renewal and the SYG's upcoming December report, Pascoe noted he would be in favor of strengthening the language of the next report on the points of Turkish Cypriot isolation and possibly recommending that UNFICYP's mandate be changed from a peacekeeping to an observer mission only as "part of a broader strategy." Because we did not yet have such a strategy, Pascoe said, he did not think that SYG Ban's December report would include such strengthened language.

¶5. (C) Turning to the subject of Georgia, Pascoe asked for Bryza's view of the Patriotic Youth Camp. Bryza responded that the camp was justified, but the location not ideal. Pascoe stated that UN policy on Georgia seemed almost designed to preserve the status quo because a small country bordering a P-5 country could never have its interests truly protected. The UN was reinforcing a status quo that kept Georgia's separatist regions under the influence of Russia. He said that he had told SYG Ban about his concerns and was pushing to conduct an overall review, which would be very political and that would likely upset Russia if implemented.

KHALILZAD